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Claire Montialoux
Essay 1
Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality 
(with Ellora Derenoncourt)
One of the most striking dimensions of inequality in the 
United States is the persistence of large racial economic 
disparities (Bayer and Charles 2018; Chetty et al. 2020). A 
major aspect of these disparities is the earnings difference 
between black and white workers. There is a 25 percent gap 
between the average annual earnings of white and African 
American workers today.1 Over the past 70 years, this gap 
fell significantly only once, during the late 1960s and early 
1970s, when it was reduced by a factor of about two. What 
made the white-black earnings gap fall? Understanding the 
factors behind this historical improvement may provide 
insights for reducing the large racial disparities that still exist 
today.
A large literature has put forward various explanations for 
the decline in racial inequality during the 1960s and 1970s, 
including federal antidiscrimination legislation (Freeman 
1973) and improvements in education (Card and Krueger 
1992; Smith and Welch 1989). The magnitude of the decline, 
however, remains a puzzle (see Donohue and Heckman 
[1991]).
This chapter provides a new explanation for falling 
racial earnings gaps during this period: the extension of the 
federal minimum wage to new sectors of the economy. The 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966 introduced the federal 
minimum wage (as of February 1967) in sectors that were 
previously uncovered and where black workers were  
overrepresented: agriculture, hotels, restaurants, schools, 
hospitals, nursing homes, entertainment, and other services. 
These sectors employed about 20 percent of the total U.S. 
workforce and nearly a third of all black workers. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the role of this major reform in the much- 
studied decline in racial inequality during the Civil Rights 
Era has not been analyzed before. We show that it had large 
positive effects on wages for low-wage workers and that the 
effects were more than twice as large for black workers as 
for white. Our estimates suggest that the 1967 extension of 
the minimum wage can explain more than 20 percent of the 
decline in the racial earnings gap between 1965 and 1980. 
Moreover, we find that this reform did not have large adverse 
employment effects on either black or white workers. The 
extension of the minimum wage thus not only reduced the 
racial earnings gap (the difference in earnings for employed 
individuals) but also the racial income gap (the difference in 
income between black and white individuals, whether work-
ing or not). To our knowledge, this chapter provides the first 
causal evidence on how minimum wage policy affects racial 
income disparities.
Our contribution in this chapter is twofold. First, we 
provide an in-depth analysis of the causal effect of the 1967 
extension of the minimum wage—a large natural quasi- 
experiment—on the dynamics of wages and employment. To 
conduct this analysis, we use a variety of data sources and 
research designs that paint a consistent picture. A key data 
contribution of this chapter is to assemble a novel dataset on 
hourly wages by industry, occupation, gender, and region. In 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) published regular industry wage reports with detailed 
information on the distribution of hourly wages by $0.05 
and $0.10 bins, including the number of workers employed 
in each of these bins. For the purposes of this research, we 
digitized more than 1,000 of these tabulations. This new data 
source allows us to provide transparent and robust evidence 
on the effects of the 1967 minimum wage extension on 
wages and employment. We also rely on microdata from the 
March Current Population Survey (CPS), which allow us to 
investigate how the effects of the reform vary with race and 
other socioeconomic characteristics such as education. Taken 
together, the CPS and BLS data enable us to provide consis-
tent and clear graphical evidence of the short- and medium- 
term impacts of the extension of the minimum wage.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we show that 
the 1967 reform had a large effect on wages for workers at 
the bottom of the earnings distribution. Our newly digitized 
BLS data reveal clear evidence of an immediate and sharp 
hourly wage increase for low-paid workers: a large mass of 
workers paid below $1 in 1966 (the level of the minimum 
wage introduced in 1967) bunches at $1 in 1967. To quantify 
the magnitude of the wage effect, our baseline empirical 
approach is a cross-industry difference-in-differences  
research design: we compare the dynamics of wages in 
the newly vs. previously covered industries, before and 
after 1967. In the CPS data, the average annual earnings of 
workers in the industries covered in 1967 (our treated group) 
evolve in parallel with the annual earnings of workers in 
the industries covered in 1938 (our control group) before 
the reform. In 1967, they jump by 5.3 percent relative to the 
control industries, and the effect persists through the late 
1970s. The magnitude of the increase is consistent with the 
predicted effect of the minimum wage hike estimated using 
the prereform CPS. We obtain a similar increase in average 
hourly wage in the newly covered industries using the BLS 
data. We estimate that 16 percent of workers in the treated 
industries are affected by the reform and that they receive 
a 34 percent wage increase on average in 1967. The wage 
effect on treated workers is large because before 1967, many 
of them (predominantly black workers) were employed at 
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wages far below the federal minimum wage of $1 introduced 
in 1967. The wage increase in the newly covered industries 
is concentrated among workers with a low level of education. 
The magnitude of the wage effect is robust to a series of tests 
and to controlling for a wide range of observable characteris-
tics and time trends.
In the second step, we study the effect of the 1967 min-
imum wage extension on employment. We first estimate 
employment’s effect using geographic variation in the bite of 
the reform. Just as today, some states had their own minimum 
wage laws (on top of the federal minimum wage) in the 1960s 
while others did not. This variation made the 1967 reform 
more or less binding across states. We build a minimum wage 
database by state, industry, and gender spanning the 1950–
2016 period. We compare states without a state minimum 
wage law as of January 1966 (strongly treated) to other states 
(weakly treated). Because the federal minimum wage was 
high in the late 1960s (much higher than today relative to the 
median wage), the 1967 reform is a particularly large shock in 
the strongly treated states. Using this research design, we show 
that the 1967 reform had a near-zero effect on employment. 
We are able to rule out employment elasticities with respect 
to average wages greater (in absolute sense) than −0.16. The 
results hold for black workers in isolation, for whom employ-
ment elasticities greater than −0.24 can be ruled out.
We build on these analyses by using our BLS data and 
implementing a bunching estimator following Harasztosi 
and Lindner (2019) and Cengiz et al. (2019). Within treated 
industries, we compare the number of workers paid strictly 
below the minimum wage and those paid at or slightly above 
the minimum wage in the observed 1967 wage distribution 
to those in a counterfactual distribution with no minimum 
wage reform. We first present estimates of the employment 
effect of the reform for an important case study—laundries in 
the U.S. South— where the reform was particularly binding 
(over one-third of workers were paid below the minimum 
wage prior to the reform) and where black workers were 
overrepresented (40 percent of the workforce). We document 
a near-zero effect on employment in this sector and region. 
We then demonstrate that this near-zero effect holds across 
many industry and region subgroups. Overall, our bunching 
results suggest low employment responses in treated indus-
tries in the United States as a whole. Our findings are robust 
to considering alternative assumptions on the extent of spill-
over effects from the minimum wage.2
The second—and most important—contribution of this 
chapter is to uncover the key role of minimum wage poli-
cies in the dynamics of racial inequality. We show that the 
extension of the minimum wage during the Civil Rights 
Era can explain more than 20 percent of the decline in the 
unadjusted black-white earnings gap observed during this 
critical time period. The reform reduced the gap through 
two channels. First, the gap between the average wage in the 
treated industries and the rest of the economy fell. Because 
black workers were overrepresented in the treated industries, 
this between-industry convergence reduced the U.S.-wide 
racial gap. Second, within the newly covered industries, the 
wage increase is much larger for black than for white work-
ers, and hence the reform sharply reduced the unadjusted 
racial gap within the treated industries. This within-industry 
effect accounts for more than 80 percent of the impact of 
the reform on the economy-wide racial gap. The reform 
also sharply reduced the adjusted racial earnings gap (i.e., 
the difference in earnings between black and white workers 
conditional on observable characteristics) within the treated 
industries, from 25 log points prior to 1967 to about 0 after. 
That is, within agriculture and laundries, for example, black 
workers were paid 25 log points less than white workers 
with similar observables (such as education, experience, and 
number of hours worked) when the federal minimum wage 
did not apply, and this difference falls to close to zero after 
the introduction of the federal minimum wage. Combined 
with the evidence of limited effects on black employment, 
these results suggest that the 1967 reform was effective at 
advancing black economic status.
Conceptually, our results are consistent with competitive 
models of the labor market characterized by low elastic-
ity of demand for workers in the newly covered industries 
and inelastic demand for black workers, in particular.3 We 
provide evidence that substitution toward white workers was 
extremely limited in the newly covered industries after the 
reform. This may stem in part from the high degree of occu-
pational segregation prevalent in the labor market at the time. 
Black workers were concentrated in low-status jobs through-
out our period of analysis, and white workers may have been 
unwilling to assume these positions at the wages prevailing 
postreform. Under these conditions, the minimum wage can 
improve black workers’ relative wages without resulting in 
their significant relative disemployment.
Essay 2
The Pass-Through of Minimum Wages into 
U.S. Retail Prices: Evidence from Supermarket 
Scanner Data
(with Tobias Renkin and Michael Siegenthaler)
In recent years, a number of U.S. states and municipalities 
have increased their minimum wage, in a context of low wage 
growth and stagnation of the federal minimum wage. Simi-
larly, several European countries have introduced a national 
minimum wage (e.g., Germany) or hiked their minimum wage 
(e.g., the United Kingdom). 
A large body of research in economics shows that mod-
erate increases in the minimum wage have no or limited 
disemployment effects (see, for example, Card and Krueger 
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[1994]; Belman and Wolfson [2014]; Cengiz et al. [2019]), 
suggesting that such a policy can raise nominal incomes of 
low-wage workers. However, there is much less evidence on 
how changes in the minimum wage affect consumer prices 
(see Lemos [2008] for a literature review) and therefore 
real incomes. In principle, it is possible that nominal wage 
increases for low-wage workers may be partly offset by 
increases in the prices of the goods and services consumed 
by the poorest households. To assess the economic impact of 
minimum wage changes on real incomes, it is thus central to 
understand the pass-through of minimum wage increases into 
prices.
We exploit a large number of changes in the minimum 
wage between 2001 and 2012 and leverage scanner-level 
data from weekly price observations of 2,500 distinct grocery 
and drug stores. We make three main contributions. First, we 
provide new evidence on how minimum wages affect prices 
in the grocery sector, which has not been previously studied 
in the literature.4 The grocery sector is especially important 
because the share of minimum wage labor costs in grocer-
ies’ marginal cost is sizable, and because groceries make 
up a large share of consumer expenditure, up to 15 percent 
for low-income households. Second, we take advantage of 
the high frequency of scanner data to study the dynamics 
of the price response over time. Since minimum wage laws 
are usually passed several months before implementation 
and typically set a schedule of increases rather than one-off 
hikes, firms may increase prices in anticipation of higher 
future minimum wages. We use a newly collected dataset 
with legislation dates for every minimum wage increase in 
our sample period, and we find strong evidence for anticipa-
tion effects. Third, we use a large consumer panel data linked 
to the store-level information to investigate how the price 
response varies across household income groups. This allows 
us to better understand the implications of minimum wage 
changes for real incomes.
Our main finding is that there is a full pass-through of 
minimum wage increases into grocery prices. Our main 
research design compares monthly price movements across 
states exploiting time variation in state-level minimum 
wage hikes. We supplement this approach by using a second 
identification strategy that exploits within-state variation 
in the bite of the hikes. We find that a 10 percent minimum 
wage hike translates into a 0.36 percent increase in gro-
cery prices. Importantly, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the average price elasticity of 0.036 and 
our estimate of the minimum wage elasticity of groceries’ 
costs, which suggests a full pass-through of minimum wage 
cost increases into prices. We do not find evidence that 
the demand for grocery products changes, nor do we find 
evidence that stores reduce employment. Taken together, 
these results suggest that consumers, rather than firm owners 
or workers, bear the bulk of the burden of minimum wage 
increases in the grocery sector.
Another important finding of this paper, with implica-
tions for macroeconomic models, is that price adjustments 
occur mostly in the three months following the passage of 
a minimum wage legislation, rather than after implementa-
tion. In other words, grocery and drug stores appear to be 
forward-looking in their pricing decisions. Using Google 
Trends data, we show that the legislation of minimum wage 
increases represents a very salient event in the public. Based 
on flexible event study regressions tracking prices around 
the months in which minimum wage hikes are legislated, 
we find that grocery stores respond to future cost increases 
by increasing prices months before the minimum wage is 
actually implemented. This type of forward-looking behavior 
of firms is qualitatively consistent with the predictions of 
purely rational models, where firms think about the future 
as well as the present (i.e., they are not myopic). The rise in 
prices occurs mostly through an increase in the frequency of 
price changes.
Last, we quantify the welfare consequences of minimum 
wage hikes after accounting for our estimated pass-through 
of minimum wages into prices. We estimate that the price 
effects of minimum wage increases are similar for goods 
usually consumed by low-income and high-income house-
holds. Low-income households are nevertheless dispropor-
tionately affected by the rise in grocery prices since a larger 
share of their expenditures is on groceries. The rise in gro-
cery store prices reduces real income by about $24 a year for 
households earning less than $10,000 a year, and by about 
$78 a year for those earning more than $150,000.
The price increases in grocery stores offset only a rela-
tively small part of the gains of minimum wage hikes. Min-
imum wage policies thus remain a redistributive tool, even 
after accounting for price effects in grocery stores.
This chapter contributes to a body of work in labor 
economics and macroeconomics. First, this chapter provides 
novel insights into the redistributive effects of minimum 
wages and into the price effects of minimum wages in low-
wage sectors. A small literature studies the product market 
effects of minimum wage increases. This literature has 
focused on restaurants (see, e.g., Aaronson [2001], Allegretto 
and Reich [2018]).5 Our contribution to this literature is to 
study the impact of minimum wage changes in a new sector, 
the grocery sector. This sector employs a high and rising 
share of workers at or just above the minimum wage; there-
fore, the effect of minimum wage hikes is potentially large.
Moreover, groceries are an important component of 
households’ cost of living, particularly for poor households. 
Groceries make up 11 percent of household expenditures, 
two to three times more than spending on restaurant meals, 
depending on household income.
We break new ground in documenting the price response 
in the retail sector, thanks to the availability of high-quality 
scanner-level data. These data enable us to overcome certain 
shortcomings in studies of the price effects of minimum 
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wages. These limitations include classical measurement 
error (Aaronson 2001; Card and Krueger 1994), the use of 
city-level CPI data that are only available in the largest U.S. 
metro areas (Aaronson 2001; Aaronson and French 2007; 
Aaronson, French, and MacDonald 2008), and the fact that 
price and wage changes in restaurants may not be well mea-
sured due to tipping and quality changes (e.g., size of por-
tions served). These concerns do not apply to retail scanner 
data, as products in grocery stores are very standardized and 
retail workers are not tipped. Compared to official BLS price 
indexes, our microdata allow us to compute price changes 
by income group (as well as price changes conditional on 
nonzero price adjustments).6
Most closely related to our work are the contemporary 
papers by Leung (forthcoming) and Ganapati and Weaver 
(2017), who also study the pass-through of minimum wage 
changes into retail prices. These papers focus on a different 
period (2006–2015 and 2005–2015, respectively, vs. 2001–
2012 in our study), are based on another dataset (the Nielsen 
data), and use different identification strategies. Ganapati and 
Weaver (2017) find a zero pass-through of minimum wage 
increases into prices, and Leung (forthcoming) more than a 
full pass-through. We reconcile our findings with these two 
studies in our appendix.
The main substantial difference between our work and 
these two studies is that we document the forward-looking 
pricing decision of grocery stores by studying the effect 
of minimum wage legislation (before implementation) on 
subsequent price changes. Two other distinctive features of 
our work include studying in detail whether our results are 
consistent with full pass-through of prices into costs, and 
quantifying the extent to which the price increases in grocery 
stores affect the redistributive effects of minimum wage 
policies.
Second, this chapter contributes to the macroeconomic 
literature on price-setting. We provide causal evidence of the 
effect of a rise in labor costs on retail price inflation. This 
adds to the macro literature that has mainly focused on the 
effects of rising wholesale costs on pricing decisions.7 Our 
detailed microdata allow us to document a price response to 
a future cost shock at the time it becomes known and several 
months before it actually occurs. Because minimum wage 
changes can be seen as a shock to grocery store activities, 
which is plausibly exogenous, these shocks can help identify 
the effect of movements in costs on prices. Our results high-
light the role of expectations in the propagation of shocks.8 
Forward-looking price setting is a central prediction of 
state-dependent models (i.e., menu cost models), as well as 
time-dependent models with nominal frictions. These latter 
models include the Calvo (1983) model of staggered price 
setting and models with adjustment costs such as Rotem-
berg (1982). In the macroeconomics literature, these models 
have been used as a microeconomic foundation for the New 
Keynesian Phillips Curve (see, e.g., Gali [2015]).
Finally, we contribute to the research on price rigidity in 
retail chains. We provide evidence that chains try to maintain 
uniform prices across grocery stores in the United States. We 
find that, within interregional chains, a minimum wage hike 
in one state affects prices in stores within the same chain 
located in another state. These results suggest that minimum 
wage hikes can affect consumer welfare in other states. 
Consistently, we find that grocery prices are more respon-
sive to local minimum wage hikes in regional chains than 
in national chains. This is consistent with Dellavigna and 
Gentzkow (2019), who document uniform pricing decisions 
in the retail sector in response to local economic shocks in 
general, and to Leung (forthcoming), who documents this 
behavior in the case of local minimum wage hikes.
Essay 3
The Economic Effect of a $15 Minimum Wage 
in the United States: A Simulation Approach 
(with Sylvia Allegretto and Michael Reich)
In April 2017, Senators Bernie Sanders (D-VT), Patty 
Murray (D-WA), and Chuck Schumer (D-NY) announced 
legislation that would raise the federal minimum wage to 
$15 an hour in the United States by 2024. In this bill, the 
minimum wage increases are phased in over eight years, 
starting with $9.25 an hour on July 1, 2017, and reaching $15 
an hour in 2024. The minimum wage would be indexed to 
the median wage growth thereafter. The goal of this chapter 
is to connect research with policy by providing an ex ante 
evaluation of this bill.
The minimum wage is a recurrent policy issue, and there 
are many analyses of the effects of minimum wage increases 
on incomes of families with members who receive a raise 
(Congressional Budget Office 2014; Cooper 2013, 2017), 
and the effects on incomes of families with members who 
lose their jobs (Congressional Budget Office 2014). Here, 
we attempt to evaluate the employment effects of mini-
mum wage policies that take into account how all economic 
agents—not just workers, but workers, businesses, and con-
sumers— are affected and respond to such a policy, and we 
integrate their responses in a unified manner. In particular, 
we take into account the effects of minimum wage increases 
on aggregate demand, and how they boost consumer spend-
ing and GDP. In what follows, we estimate a calibrated labor 
market model that we created specifically to analyze the 
effects of a $15 minimum wage. We compare employment 
numbers if policy were adopted to employment numbers if 
the policy had not been adopted.
We find that the proposed policy would result in sub-
stantial benefits to low-wage workers and their families, 
raising wages for 41.5 million workers by 2024. Annual pay 
for these workers will increase by 17.3 percent, or $3,470 
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by 2024. These pay increases will raise overall wages in 
for-profit businesses by only 0.6 percent in the United 
States. This amount is surprisingly small because many of 
the workers who are now paid below $15 are already paid 
above the current minimum wage, and because the pay of 
low-wage workers makes up a small share of total payroll 
costs. Businesses will absorb the additional payroll costs 
partly through savings on employee turnover costs, higher 
worker productivity gains, and some automation. Most of the 
increase in costs will likely be passed on to consumers via 
increased prices. Since labor costs make up only about one-
fourth of operating costs, consumer prices will increase only 
slightly—about 0.6 percent over the entire phase-in period. 
Prices will be most affected in the restaurant industry, where 
they will increase by 4.3 percent over the entire phase-in 
period. These higher prices by themselves would somewhat 
reduce consumer sales and reduce the demand for labor. 
But simultaneous positive effects on increased consumer 
spending from workers receiving wage increases will offset 
these negative effects. After taking into account all these 
factors, we estimate that the proposed minimum wage policy 
would increase overall U.S. employment (as a percent of 
total employment) by 0.1 percent by 2024, over the baseline. 
This estimate is cumulative (and so will be spread over the 
phase-in period). In comparison, U.S. employment is pro-
jected to grow 0.45 percent annually in the same time period. 
We also find a similar employment effect for Mississippi. 
In sum, we find that a $15 minimum wage by 2024 would 
substantially improve living standards for nearly 30 percent 
of the U.S. workforce (and 44 percent of Mississippi’s) 
without generating a significant net adverse employment 
effect. The minimum wage increase will be paid for primar-
ily by induced efficiencies (more automation, productivity 
gains, and turnover savings) and slight price increases borne 
by all consumers. Based on our analysis, we conclude that 
the proposed minimum wage will have its intended effects 
in improving incomes for low-wage workers. Any effects on 
employment and overall economic growth are likely to be 
small. The net impact of the policy will therefore be positive.
Notes
1. The racial earnings gap is measured here as the mean log annual 
earnings difference between white and black workers (i.e., 
conditional on working) using two data sources with information 
on earnings: decennial U.S. census data, from which we measure 
earnings from 1949 onwards; and an annual data source: the 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Pop-
ulation Survey, from which we measure earnings from 1961 to 
2015. Both data sources paint a consistent picture. 
2. Under the assumption of spillovers up to 115 percent (120 
percent) of the minimum wage, we calculate an employment 
elasticity of 0.06 (−0.21) in the treated industries as a whole, 
qualitatively similar to our CPS estimates and well in the range 
of those in the broader minimum wage literature.
3.  Our results are also consistent with monopsonistic models of 
the labor market in which the minimum wage falls above the 
monopsonist’s but below the perfect competitor’s wage.
4.  In this chapter, we use “grocery sector” for grocery and drug 
stores. Likewise, we sometimes use “grocery stores” throughout 
the chapter for grocery stores and drug stores.
5.  Outside of the United States, Fougere (2010) analyzes the 
response of restaurant prices to an increase in the French min-
imum wage. Harasztosi and Lindner (2019) analyze the price 
response of a large minimum wage increase in Hungary in the 
manufacturing sector.
6.  The official BLS indexes, although less detailed than microdata, 
also have a number of strengths to study the effect of minimum 
wage changes: they are weighted at all levels of aggregation, 
rely on case-by-case adjustments for item turnover, and the 
BLS has established procedures for dealing with missing price 
observations. 
7.  For instance, Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011) find 
that pass-through is complete but somewhat delayed. Nakamura 
and Zerom (2010), using variation in the market price of com-
modity coffee, find that the pass-through into wholesale prices 
is about one-third, but that the increase of wholesale prices is 
completely passed through to consumers by retail stores.
8.  Relatedly, Leduc and Wilson (2013) show that public infrastruc-
ture projects have both announcement and disbursement effects. 
Infrastructure spending shocks and minimum wage shocks 
operate on different margins (supply versus demand shocks), 
but the propagation of both kinds of shocks appear to draw on 
expectation channels.
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